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Abstract
An efficient peer grading mechanism is proposed for
grading the multitude of assignments in online courses.
This novel approach is based on game theory and
mechanism design. A set of assumptions and a
mathematical model is ratified to simulate the dominant
strategy behavior of students in a given mechanism. A
benchmark function accounting for grade accuracy and
workload is established to quantitatively compare
effectiveness and scalability of various mechanisms. After
multiple iterations of mechanisms under increasingly
realistic assumptions, three are proposed: Calibration,
Improved Calibration, and Deduction. The Calibration
mechanism performs as predicted by game theory when
tested in an online crowd-sourced experiment, but fails
when students are assumed to communicate. The
Improved Calibration mechanism addresses this
assumption, but at the cost of more effort spent grading.
The Deduction mechanism performs relatively well in the
benchmark, outperforming the Calibration, Improved
Calibration, traditional automated, and traditional peer
grading systems. The mathematical model and
benchmark opens the way for future derivative works to
be performed and compared.
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Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been a tremendous
increase in the popularity of MOOCs (Massive Open
Online Courses) and their importance to education as a
whole. Popular MOOC systems such as Coursera or EdX
are well funded, which explains their rapid growth: 60
million dollars were invested in EdX when it started in
May of 2012 [8]. The main importance of MOOCs is their
ability to educate massive numbers of students
worldwide [3]: by the end of 2012, 1.7 million students
had attended a course through Coursera [6]. This leads to
high student-professor ratios, reaching 150,000:1 in some
courses.
High student-professor ratios lead to problems for
professors, who are simply unable to grade hundreds of
thousands of submissions. Currently, two types of
solutions are used to remedy the problem: automated
grading and peer grading [7]. Automated grading relies on
machines, which can only check certain types of answers
(i.e. multiple choice), severely limiting the depth of the
questions asked [1]. Even though automated grading for
written essays is an active area of research with much
recent progress, the quality and accuracy of such systems
is under heavy debate [4]. Students who know the
machine’s grading criteria can fool the system [9], yielding
inconsistent grades. On the other hand, peer grading can
grade any type of question. However, such systems can
easily be “hacked” by the students [3]. Additionally, lack
of feedback from peer grading is an area of complaint in
systems such as Coursera [10]. These limitations render
the students unable to effectively evaluate mastery of
course material.
We propose several peer grading mechanisms based on
game theory and our student model - a set of assumptions
we believe students abide by. We also create a benchmark
to compare between our and existing mechanisms.
Although a theoretical model cannot predict exactly what
will happen in practice, game theory and mechanism
design have a history of generally determining mechanisms
that work in practice from ones that do not [5].
Mechanisms that do not follow game theoretic constraints
may work in the short-term, but they will be exploited if
possible in the long term [2].
Model and Assumptions
Our student model consists of assumptions we believed
students abide by, as follows:
1. Let H be a function of a student’s grade, returning
a student’s happiness, such that a grade of zero
yields zero happiness (H(0) = 0).
Happiness is an arbitrary numerical unit.
2. Students want to maximize their happiness.
3. Grading an assignment costs 1 (one) happiness.
4. Happiness is not affected by external factors, such
as the grades of peers.
5. Students can communicate with their peers.
6. Students are not perfect graders.
7. There is no such thing as partial-grading. Students
either grade or do not grade.
8. Students can report their level of uncertainty (U)
when they grade.
9. More effort spent in grading lowers uncertainty.
10. The chance of a student-assigned grade G being N
off from the actual grade is proportional to U.
With a student model in place, it is now possible to
simulate student behavior with game theory.
Benchmark
In order to eventually determine the effectiveness of
various mechanisms, as well as to compare mechanisms,
we created a numerical benchmark (objective function)
where a lower score is better. The score is computed by
adding the highest possible error in student grading to the
most work done by any person. Mathematically:
maxi≥1{|H(gi)−H(oi)|}+maxi≥1{wi}
where wi is the work done (assignments graded) by the
ith person, gi is the grade given by student grader on the
ith assignment, and oi is the accurate “objective” grade
that would have been given by the professor on the ith
assignment. H is the happiness function defined in the
Models and Assumptions section.
Mechanisms
Calibration Mechanism
The Calibration mechanism, described visually in
Figure 1,achieves a low benchmark score of 4, consisting
of a 2 in max work done and 2 in max error in grade.
Figure 1: A flowchart of the Calibration Mechanism from the
student perspective.
We tested and verified the Calibration mechanism through
an anonymous crowd-sourced experiment. We wrote a
program that presented participants with two sets of
randomly generated orange and blue colored objects.
Each set represented an assignment, and “grading” an
assignment involved counting the number of orange
objects in each set. After observing the set for a randomly
chosen amount of time, participants were asked to input
the number of orange objects they thought they saw in
each set. Initially unknown to the participant, one set is
“calibrated” and will be used to reward the participant
based on the accuracy of the grading. This reward,
awarded for accurately grading the Calibrated set, is
synonymous to the punishment administered by the
professor upon improperly grading the Calibrated set.
Figure 2: Uncalibrated Error vs Reward
The results of this experiment can be seen in Figure 2,
where grading error is plotted against relative magnitude
of reward. This shows that a higher reward correlates to
lower error. As the reward is administered based on the
grader’s performance on the Calibrated set, the correlation
implies that the graders who perform well on the
Calibrated set also perform well on the non-calibrated set.
This verifies that the Calibration mechanism indeed works.
Improved Calibration Mechanism
Originally designed with the assumption that students
cannot communicate, the Calibration mechanism quickly
breaks when student conspire to reveal the calibrated
assignment to circumvent grading. The Improved
Calibration mechanism mitigates this issue by introducing
multiple calibrated papers at the expense of more work,
raising the objective score. However, since the work
created by this mechanism does not scale well with class
size, the Deduction mechanism was developed.
Deduction Mechanism
The Deduction mechanism (Figure 3) achieves a very low
benchmark score of 2, with 2 in max work done and a 0 in
max error in grade. Incapable graders will raise the
benchmark score, as they issue refutations that add work
to the professor.
Figure 3: A flowchart of the Deduction Mechanism from the
student perspective.
Results
The comparison of existing solutions and those proposed
in this work can be seen in Figure 4. Each mechanism will
be explained below.
Traditional Professor Grading involves one professor
grading all assignments. In an online class of 1000
students, this method is extremely inefficient.
In Traditional Peer Grading, each student grades another’s
assignment without any supervision. However, as in this
mechanism, the objective score is high due to the potential
error caused by lack of motivation to grade properly.
Although without requiring effort from either professor or
student, Traditional Automated Grading of open-ended
responses are still under heavy research. Current solutions
are quite preliminary, though can arrive at a grade within
approximately 25 percent [4].
The Calibration Mechanism requires one calibrated paper
from the professor and two papers graded by each
student. The objective score is raised to 4 instead of 2
because students are incentivized by increasing their
grade, thus sacrificing accuracy.
The Improved Calibration Mechanism requires each
student to grade a subset of the other student’s
assignments, and the teacher to grade another subset.
This mechanism addresses the flaw in the Calibration
Mechanism that occurs when students can communicate,
at the expense of more work. Thus, leading to poor
scalability.
The Deduction Mechanism rewards graders for grading
more harshly than their peers, and relies on a voting
system to reject grades that are below the expected grade
to be reviewed by the professor. In the dominant strategy
behavior of the system, no grades should be rejected,
leading to no work for the professor. Again, incentive
given to the students comes at the cost of accuracy,
raising the objective score by two points.
Overall, our Calibration and Deduction mechanisms vastly
outperform existing solutions with the exception of
Improved Calibration.
Figure 4: A comparison of mechanisms in terms of
effectiveness and scalability.
Conclusion
In this paper, a student model was first created - a set of
assumptions that approximate the realistic behavior of
students. Based on this model, various grading
mechanisms were developed: Calibration, Improved
Calibration, and Deduction. These mechanisms incentivize
students to grade accurately and efficiently as proven by
game theory. The Calibration mechanism was tested with
a crowd-sourced experiment, showing that it could work in
practice. The student model can easily be reused and
improved upon by future researchers who wish to develop
more efficient solutions to more realistic scenarios.
Mechanism efficiency can be measured in terms of
benchmark defined in this paper. The benchmark is a
numerical score encompassing both the accuracy of grades
and the effort spent by any one person. The inclusion of
effort spent by any one person in the benchmark enables
the grading system scalability to be taken into account.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first
game-theory-based peer-grading mechanisms.
Future Work
The further improvement and development of mechanisms
may involve adding more realistic assumptions to the
student model, which in turn may require more complex
mechanisms. For example, a more complex mechanism
may be required to generate accurate grades from
incompetent graders. Of course, more testing and
validation of mechanisms with crowd-sourced experiments
is necessary. Eventually, new mechanisms based off the
student model or existing mechanisms could be
implemented in commercial MOOCs such as EdX or
Coursera.
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